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The problem posed by the availability of means of payment has been of a central
interest to historians analysing the process of industrialisation. For instance, T. S.
Ashton found that bills of exchange constituted an important medium of exchange
among industrial Úrms in Lancashire during the period 1790-1830.2 A possible
explanation for this is the need for large volumes of exchange media during periods
of exceptional econornic growth. In the Lancastrian case, the demand for money,
arising from substancial numbers of cornmercial transactions, appean to have
exceeded the available supply of currency. A similar development in Catalonia
during the period 1844-74 will be considered in the body of this papero
New developments in monetary theory provide a rnicroeconornic basis for
understanding these rustorical episodes. In particular, the intention here is to analyse
the mechanisms that allow the emergence of different media of exchange during
periods of currency shortage, such as that experienced in Catalonia over the mid-
nineteenth century. Theoretical search models of money explain how both market
forces create their own mechanisms ro facilitate exchange, and agents adopt conven-
tions about the use of different means of exchange. The main implication arising
from these kinds of model is that the basic characteristic of any good used as a
medium of exchange is acceptability to the agents in the economy. Other intrinsic
1 Different drafts of this paper were presented at the Quantitative Economic History Conference
(Cambridge, Eng/and, Sep. 1994), the Economic History Seminar, Universitat de Barcelona and the
Economic and Business History Couference (Boulder, Colo., Apr. 1995). We wish to thank al!
participants, and an anonyrnous referee, for helpful comments; they, ofcourse, have no responsibility
for any rernaíning errors.
2 T. S. Ashton, 'The bill of exchange and privare banks in Lancashire, 1790-1830', Economic History
Review, 1.5 (194.5); and reprinted in T. S. Ashton and R. S. Sayers (eds), Papers in English Monetary
History (Oxford, 1953; reprinted 1954, 1967).
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characteristics of money, such as durability, homogeneity, etc., might be desirable
but are unnecessary for a good to fulfIl the role ofmedium ofexchange.
The prime aim of this paper is to study the factors that made bilIs of exchange
acceptable as means of payment when they were alongside other, more 'natural',
exchange media, especialIy legal currencies. The data employed are drawn from the
records of three different textile firms. Their entire accounts are available and
indicate alI sales, and the media of exchange used for their payment, during two
years, 1859 and 1860. As these data have been drawn from primary sources, they
can be considered to be of exceptional accuracy. Moreover, the three firms were
very different, in terms of technology employed, location and size.
The present interest lies in analysing the determinants of the acceptability of
different types ofbills as money and to consider their varying characteristics. lt wilI
be argued that the acceptability ofa specific asset may depend on variables reflecting
the nature oE the particular transaction giving rise to the debt and its commercial
counterpart. A debatable point requiring clarification is: to what extent can bilis of
exchange be considered as money? On the one hand, it will be maintained that bilis
were taken as the means of payment for numerous dealings among flrms but, on
the other hand, it is clear that they were not accepted in alI and every transaction.
The obvious compromise reached is ro consider bilis of exchange, and other com-
parable documents, as media of exchange having restricted circulation within com-
mercial networks.
In short, the main premise is that bilis of exchange constituted money iE agents
wished ro take them as such. The only requirement for an asset to be used as money
would be its acceptability arising from agents so concurring in the market.
Furthermore, it can be argued that monetary supply does not solely comprise legal
status money. In particular contexts, individual agents' actions in the market will
determine the amount and type oE money. For this reason alone, the role oE the
supply oflegal money should be given less importance than previously. For instance,
while there was a great shortage of legal status currency in Catalonia during the
period studied, this proved not to be an insurmountable obstacle in the way oE
marked economic growth, which contradicts other traditional explanations of the
relationship between monetary supply and economic growth. Our analysis provides
a possible framework explaining the possibility of economic growth despite restric-
tions in me supply oflegal money.
Section 1 offers a brief, intuitive description of the theoretical arguments con-
cerned with the nature of money as medium of exchange and which are germane
to this investigation. The monetary and financial system in Catalonia during the
mid-nineteenth century, the period of investigation, is outlined in section n. The
uses oE bills of exchange, and other documents, are illustrated and discussed in
section III. In section IV, the database employed is described, folIowing which an
econometric test of our hypothesis is undertaken. The implications and possible
extensions oE our analysis are taken up briefiy in the concluding section.
One of the recurrent questions in the economic literature about money is: what
circumstances determine which objects will come to be used as generalIy accepted
media of exchange? Although this is an interesting issue from a purely theoretical
point ofview, it has not aroused much attention amongst applied economists. This
Iruly be explained by most late twentieth-century economies relying on the general-
ised use of fiat money, issued with the legal backing of the political authorities of
each country. However, this has not always been the case. As wili be detailed below,
economic historians have considered episodes in the past when different objects
were used as media of exchange. 3 Most of mese OCCUITences were a result of the
unconcerted market behaviour of rnany individual agents, being another outcome
oftheir commercial relationships. Consequently, it is interesting to ask: what objects
would come to be used as money, what determines this particular choice and what
are the possible consequences of this at a more aggregated level? For instance, to
develop further the third of these questions, how can this affect the definition of
money supply and its relationship with economic development?
Surely the key, determining factor of the circulation of any type of medium of
exchange is its acceptability. An object is more likely to be established as money if
it is so regarded by many individuals within the economy. In this respect, one can
say that acceptability has a self-reinforcing natme. lt is not an intrinsic property of
goods being used as medium of exchange but, rather, of the social conventions
governing particular patterns of exchange between economic agents. This intuitive
conclusion wilI hold for any object employed as medium ofexchange. It wilI be the
case whether the good is either an intrinsicalIy worthless object - fiat money - or
an object valued for consumption, or production, by sorne agents that, nevertheless,
is accepted by further agents only for its exchange value and to be traded for other
goods (commodity money).
These are not new notions in monetary theory since they were established by
Sorne of the first economists to explore the question of money. Thus Menger4
emphasised the concept ofsaleability (taken here as being synonymous with related
notions, such as acceptability or marketability) of goods used as medium of
exchange. The question arises: does this mean that any object could appear as
money as long as there was sorne sort of social agreement about its acceptability as
medium of exchange?
The previous discussion seems to overlook other aspects ofmoney that have aIso
received considerable attention from economists. In answering questions about the
circumstances when a particular object may come to be used as a medium of
J An illustrative example of thís is the Iitecature concerned wíth the free-banking experience. See
particularly: L. H. White, FrEe Banking in Britain: Theory, Experienre and Debate, 1800-1845
(Cambridge, 1984); ídem (ed.), Free Banking (Aldershot, 1993); and K. Dowd (ed.), The Experience oj
Free Banking (London, 1992).
4 K. Menger, 'On the origin ofmoney', EccnomicJourndl, 2, (1892).
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exchange, the importance of different objects' imrinsic properties has been stressed
in order to assess the likelihood of them appearing as money. Jevons gave a list of
the features required by any object to be suitable for performing the function of
medium ofexchange.5 Among others, he regarded portability, homogeneity, divisi-
bility, stability of value, cognisability and indestructibility as necessary qualities of
any cornmodity perfonning the role of money.
This alternative explanation about the characteristics of money could be seen as
somewhat contradictory with the previous account that stressed the conventional
aspect of money but only highlighted the acceptability aspect of the media of
exchange. The arising questions tú be answered are: can any good emerge as a
medium of exchange provided that there is a sufflciencly extended social agreemem
about its role? Or, on the comrary, do speciúc intrinsic properties ofgoods prec1ude
them from becoming generally-accepted media of exchange? Recem developments
in the theory of money, using concepts from search theory and modern dynamic
economic modelling, iliustrate this trade-offbetween endogenous acceptability and
intrinsic properties. They help tú provide satisfactúry answers to such questions.
The principal conclusions of mese models will be described, in conjunction with
examining the insights they provide for the analysis of the particular problem
posed here.
Most models in monetary economics have focused on fmding equilibria in which
an object, previously and exogenously determined as money, has a positive price.
In other words, the object is considered valuable by individuals to perfonn the role
ofmedium ofexchange. However, search theoretical monetary models are, in many
senses, models of currency choice, in which the commodity used as money is
deterrnined as part of the model's equilibrium. Thus their crucial feature is that they
provide a framework in which the deterrninants of the circulation of differem
objects as media of exchange are analysed endogenously.6
Search theoretical models of money study decentralised economies, in which
agents take decisions independencly. Nevertheless, in equilibrium, sorne mechan-
isms of coordination of monetary exchange appear. Thus, whenever an agem has tú
decide about exchanging a good currencly being held for another good mat is not a
consumption good (that is, a good tú be used as medium of exchange), two things
must be evaluated. The first is the marketability of the good, which is something
determined jointly by the trading strategies of all agents in the economy and,
moreover, which is precisely what makes a particular good more or less acceptable.
The second is the particular imrinsic characteristics of this good mat makes it more,
or less, costly to hold in an invemory. Goods can be more, or less, storable since
they have differem durabilities and the risk arises that they may perish before mey
5 S.]evons, Money and the Mechanism qfExchange (London, 1875).
6 The basic references are: N. Kiyotaki and R. Wright, 'On money as a medium ofexchange',]oumal
qf Polítical Econorny, 97 (1989); R. Wright, 'Search, evolurion and money', ]oumal qf Economic
Dynarnics and Control, 19 (1995); and X. Cuadras-Morat6, 'Comrnodity money in the presence of
goods ofheterogeneous quality', Economic Theory, 4 (1994).
can be disposed oE Equally, they might be of heterogeneous quality, etc. In other
words, a good might be very acceptable and, as a consequence, have a liquidity
advantage, even if it is relatively costly tú hold. Yet, on the other hand, goods with
relatively low costs could be less acceptable in equilibrium because of agents'
particular trading strategies. The equilibria and their characteristics will depend
preeisely on the joint interaction of all these factors while the different media of
exchange used by agents in this economy are deterrnined endogenously in equilib-
rium. lt can be put forward that these types of theoretical constructs constitute
natural devices for analysing the speciúc endogenous choice of media of exchange
made by agents in the economy.
What are the implications of these models for the speci6c historical problem
being studied in this paper? As will be shown below, neither cornmodity money
nor úat money are being examined but, rather, sorne other objects, namely docu-
ments such as promissory notes and bilis of exchange. It will be argued that mey
circulated as media of exchange among únns during Catalonia's industrialisation.
The aim is to understand the reasons that give individual entrepreneurs the incentive
tú accept sorne particular objects as media of exchange in a speciúc historical
contexto In order tú do so, sorne of the conclusions derived in search theoretical
models are applied to the type of situation encountered by an individual fUIn. The
únn must decide about whether accepting, or not, sorne privately-issued document
as a medium of exchange. It will be argued mat the probability of its acceptance by
a particular úrm, together with the particular features of the object used as money,
will be determined by the nature of the transaction and the characteristics of both
the trading partner and the market in which agents interact.
A úrst detennining factor regarding the acceptance of documents, other than
money, is the general context wimin which the entrepreneurs operate. The relative
scarcity of ftat money will cause the progressive substitution of this kind ofmedium
of exchange. Omer objects wili come to be used by agents in payments for their
transactions, depending on their relative abundance and me willingness of other
agents to accept memo Consequencly, there is a need for sorne localisation variable
which may control for this effect in the empirical model put forward.
Second, variables must be inc1uded in the model that may indicate whether there
is a long-tenn commercial relationship between a firm and a particular customer.
This arises because we believe that ftnns will take documents proffered by different
customers as distinct objects. In turn, this is due to there being a reputation effect,
wim it being likely that long-term customers are considered to be 'good quality'
dients. Consequently, they will be allowed to pay wim privately-issued documents,
such as bilis of exchange or others. This is a variant to theoretical models, in which
interaction takes place among anonymous agents and no allowance is made for
reputation effects. However, in framing the model in more realistic terms, flrms
clearly have different types of customers who can be readily identifled and, as a
consequence, this must be taken into account. One way to make allowance for this
feature is to put forward the hypothesis that different customers pay their debts with
32, FINANCIAL HISTORY REVIEW BILLS OF EXCHANGE AS MONEY 33
documents which are considered to have differing qualities by their creditor fmns.
Quality is related to the different information and degrees of trust that the creditor
fmn has about its customers and is related to the notion of reputation.
Fina1ly, sorne consideration 1S paid to the choice of documents with different
intrinsic qualities offered to creditor E1rms. In particular, the choice between docu-
ments to be paid before a given date and those without this restriction is modelled
in order to analyse the detennining factors of this election.
11
The Catalan economy grew very rapidly during the period T844-74, leading to it
becoming the first Spanish industrial region and one of the most important on the
European continent. The main industry by far was cotton textiles. It completed its
mechanisation over the mid-nineteenth century and, thereby, obtained sorne
important improvements in productivity. At the same time, modern transport net-
works were built, most notably railways, while sizeable towns grew up. This trans-
formation, which occurred over a relative1y short period of time, re11ed almost
exclusively upon domestic capital supplies. Furthennore, over this period, Catalonia
had a sizeable balance of trade defIcit with the rest of the world due to substantial
imports of technology and raw materials, mainly coal and cotton. 7
The fmancial system also underwent a series of important changes. Befare the
mid-1 830S there were onIy a small number of private bankers but, in 1842"
legislative reform allowed banks ro be established as limited liability companies. 8
Furtherrnore, sorne of these incorparated banks were granted local note-issuing
monopolies although their notes were on1y legally valid within the towns where
they were issued. Qne of these banks, the Banc de Barcelona, was established in
1844.9 Two other, but less important, banks were founded in the Catalan towns of
Reus and Tarragona in 1862, and 1864 respective1y. Furthennare, several different
banking corporations were created in Barcelona in 1855, sorne of which were
similar to sociétés de crédit while others were comparable to cornmercial banks.
However, many of these new banks were adversely affected by the 1866 fmancial
crisis. The mid-century period ended with a major change in T874, when the Banco
de España was granted the monopoly of the issue oElegal currency for the whole of
Spain, so ending the system ofmultiple local monopolies.
The main sources of currency had been Spain's trading surplus with its American
colonies and the direct transfer of taxes from the colonies. However, Spain had a
significant trading deE1cit with the rest of the world, which led to a sizeable share of
7 The major !iterarure on the Catalan industrialisation comprises: J. Nadal, ElftacaJo de la revolución
industrial en España (Barcelona, 1974); andJ. Maluquer, 'La revolución industrial en Cataluña', in N.
Sánchez-Albomoz (ed.), La Modernización Económica de España (Madrid. 1985).
" G. Tortella, Los Orígenes del Capitalismo en España (Madrid, 1973)·
9 For rhe history of this bank, see F. Cabana, Historia del Banc de Barrelona (1844-1920) (Barcelona.
1978). lIIIl
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Figure 1. Barcelona wholesale price index, 1810-90 (191] = 100)
the currency arriving from America being re-exported to settle international debts.
Furthennore, the Convention and Napoleonic wars and the loss of the colonies in
Alnerica resulted in a difficult situation regarding new imports ofbullion far offset-
ting the already chronic Spanish trading deficit. The main consequences of these
disruptions of the early nineteenth century were the progressive loss of gold and
silver and a considerable reduction of the domestic money supply. This led ro the
whole economy experiencing a deep deflationary crisis during the first three decades
of the nineteenth century (see Figure 1).10 Consequently, the monetary system in
Spain during this period became very complex, although addressed by successive
refonns. t1
Between 1830 and 1874, different governments implemented legislation dealing
with the monetary problem. The most important refonns took place in 1842, 1848
and 1864 but these measures were not successful, being insufficient to establish
sources ofstable monetary supply. This was due to a number of reasons. First, there
were several frustrated attempts to create new and definitive monetary units: reales
de vellón, escudos and duros. AH failed because the government was unable to amass
enough gold and silver for rninting sufficient coinage. Furthennore, they produced
10 For a recent review of this point, see P. Pascual and C. Sudria, Quiebra colonial y ajuste monetario
en España, mimeo (1992); while a critical view can be found in L. Prados, 'El comercio exterior,
1792-1827. La pérdida de las colonias americanas y sus efectos sobre la economía española', in
J. Fontana (ed.), La Economía Española alfinal del AnliRuo RéRinren. III. Cornerdo y Colonias (Madrid,
1982).
11 On the development of the Spanish monetary system, see J. Sarda, La PolÍliw Monetaria y las
FI~tuaciones de la Economía Española en el siglo XIX (Madrid, 1948); G. Tortella, 'Las magnitudes
monetarias y sus detenninantes', in P. Schwartz (ed.), La Blmca Española en la Restauración, 2 vols
(Madrid, 1974); and idem, 'Los sistemas monetario y bancario', in M. Tuñón de Lara (ed.), Historia
de Espafítl (Barcelona, 1981).
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Source: P. Pascual and C. Sudria, Qniebra colonial y ajuste monetario en España, mimeo
(1992).
a complicated and confusing monetary system due to multiple coexisting monetary
units. Second, the creation of different issuing banks proved not to be totally
successful. In Catalonia, for instance, although it might be thought that the presence
of the Banc de Barcelona in the money market would solve, at least partially, sorne
of the regional economy's problems, it actuaIly proved otherwise. This was because
the bank's management adopted very conservative poJicies and maintained substan-
tial amounts of capital in reserve through searching for greater stability. The bank's
behaviour was such that, through holding so large reserves, at the worst moments
of the economic cycle its net contribution to the creation of monetary supply was
. 12
negatlve.
During 1852 new fiat money was added to the issues of the Banc de Barcelona.
This arase from the goverrunent deciding to substitute new coins, calderilla castel-
lana, for the old copper coins minted in Barcelona. The latter were the same as
copper coins traditionally used elsewhere in Spain but with a different weight and
value. However, the government lacked suflicient coins to 111.1ke a complete substi-
tution and, as a consequence, had to issue notes to cover the difference. These had
redemption dates as they were to be progressively replaced by the new coins. It was
required that the notes were used for transactions with the goverrunent. In addition,
the legal regulations laid down that a fixed percentage of any private debt could be
paid in these notes. Nonetheless, the notes found less acceptability amongst the
public than either those issued by the Banc de Barcelona or the metaIlic currency.
Consequently, they fell below their par value.
In addition, from 1855, the new banking companies issued other types offman-
cial instruments in order both to attract new capital and circumvent the Banc de
Barcelona's note-issuing monopoly. These took the fonu of bonels and cheques,
obligacions al portador and talons registrats, which were used by the public as means
of payrnent (see Table 1). Obligacions al portador were bonds issued by the banks
that had to be paid to the bearer at the oflice of the issuing bank in metallic
currency. Talons registrats were private notes created by the board of directors of a
12 J. R. Rosés, Banca i indústria a Catalunya, 1844-1874, M.A. thesis (Universitat cle Barcelona, 1993).
Table l. Fiat money issued in Catalonía until the end of1858
Type
Bank notes
Bitllets-Calderilla
Talons registrats
Obligacions
Total
Issued by
Banc de Barcelona
Diputació de Barcelona
credit and commercial banks
credit and commercial banks
Duros
2, 124,275
1,739,123
63 6,3 81
2, 024,25 0
6,524,029
% oftotal
]2.56
26.65
9.76
31 .03
100.00
1.
bank and backed by the same bank, which had to be paid to the bearer under the
same circumstances. Although these documents were sometimes caIled bitllets
[notes], this type of money had no legal standing. Sorne agents accepted these
instruments as payment for relatively important transactions, such as stock market
dealings, but they were seldom used in daily cornmercial operations.
As Figure 1 indicates, between 1844 and 1874 the price level in Catalonia rose
slightly at 0.64 per cent per annum. Analysing different sub-periods indicates that
there is some correlation between the changes in the financial system and the
movement of prices. The absolute monopoly of the Banc de Barcelona from 1844
to 1855 resulted in a low inflation rate (1.07 per cent). The following period,
1855-66, when more corporate banks were active in the 111.1rket, is characterised by
a much higher inflation rate (3.04 per cent). The period after the crisis of 1866
(1866-74) is distinguished by a relatively important deflation rate (-3.14 per cent).
Following Milton Friedman13 on bimetallism, it might be thought that this
particular monetary regime gave rise to general price stability. Nevertheless, it wili
be argued that this was not necessarily so in the Spanish case because the volume of
gold and silver in circulation was found to be very s111.111. 14
To sum up so faL The following e1ements in the mid-nineteenth Catalan experi-
ence have been found: rapid economic growth in a very short period of time, a
significant international trading deÚcit met by exports of specie, price stability and,
fmaIly, an apparent shortage of currency. Their conjunction seems to contradict
standard macroeconomic theory. We argue that a possible explanation to this puzzle
lies in the use of biUs of exchange, and other privately-issued documents, as means
of payment, probably due to the shortage of other altemative media of exchange.
111
Bills of exchange and similar instruments had been used in intemational transactions
in continental Europe since at least the thirteenth century and Catalonia was no
exception. For a long time, their use was regulated by commercial practice. During
the eighteenth century, somewhat like legal developments in England, the
Consulats de Comer~ [local associations of merchants created under royal patron-
age] of several towns made various rulings goveming the creation, and use, of bilis
of exchange and similar instruments. Nevertheless, the defmitive basis for the regu-
lation of these types of financial instrument was not established until 1821 with the
promulgation of the flrSt Spanish Code of Cornmercial Law. This new legal code
allowed the homologation of their use in trading relationships.
The Spanish Code was modelled upon the French Code, so that it was very
detailed. Bills of exchange were defined as contracts involving a prívate promise of
payment. Generically, the Cade established two basic types ofbills: those that had
13 M. Friedman, Money MiJchi~f Episodes in Monetary History (New York, 1992).
14 Tortella, 'Las magnitudes monetarias'.
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Figure 3. The use rifpromíssory note as an instrnment rifcredit
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Figure 2. The use rifbill rifexchange as a medium rif tranifer money
them. The initial production of cloth was financed by the yam úrm through an
open credit. After 90 days of open credit, the weaving flrm signed a promissory
note which was backed by the printing úrm. The promissory note was retained to
the day that it had to be redeemed, or was discounted at a bank or, fma1ly, could be
used as medium of exchange. Summing up, the promissory note was part of a
general contract of sale and credit.
However, the main use of the bill of exchange in Catalonia during the mid-
nineteenth century was as a medium of exchange. A representative case can be seen
examining the reIationship between Pere Turull (details ofthis merchant's cornmer-
..
to be paid within a specified number of days after their presentation (e.g. eight
days), but with their tenure hITÚted to a maximum of40 days; and those that had to
be paid on a particular date (e.g. 24 February 1834). The bill need not be signed by
the drawee and, consequently, many were incomplete contracts. Nonetheless, in
these instances, the drawee had the legal responsibihty for the payment of the bill.
This legal framework also defllled other different types of documents. Promissory
notes [pagarés] were considered to be bills signed by the debtor and were legally
enforceable only in the town where they had been issued. These were much safer
instruments from a legal point of view because their ultimate enforcement ITÚght
involve the seizure of real estate. There were also cartes-ordre, which were similar
to bills of exchange but legally valid only in the town where they had been issued.
Initially, bills of exchange were created as instruments to make transfers between
merchants located at different places. In particular, when a customer located outside
Catalonia wanted to cancel a debt, he would buy a bill against a firm in an important
flllancial centre in Spain or Catalonia and send it to his Catalan creditor. The
demand for bills ofexchange varied, depending on their place of origin with, during
this period, the Spanish flllancial market not being integrated. For these reasons, the
prices for bills could vary .15
An example of the use of the bill of exchange to make a transfer is illustrated in
Figure 2. It begins with a Catalan entrepreneur sending cotton textiles to another
tradesman in Málaga. In order to cancel the arising debt, the Málaga merchant
required currency that is valid in Barcelona. He obtained a bill of exchange against
Barcelona from his banker, which he dispatched to his supplier. Finally, the bill was
'extinguished' by the signature of the final holder ofthe bill and was retumed to the
original drawer.
The developing use ofbi1ls of exchange led to them becoITÚng, at sorne moment
of time, instruments of credit and a medium of exchange. In Spain, both bills of
exchange and proITÚssory notes could be used as credit instruments. However, the
bill of exchange was an incomplete contract because it was seldom signed by the
debtor while the promissory note was a complete contract as it always had to be
signed by the borrower. The merchant banker bought a bill from the local trader as
the basis for lending money to him. Thereafter, this bill was negotiated and went
from one town to another, being used as a medium to transfer money. Fina1ly, it
was encashed on its expiry date by the last holder with the borrower paying its value.
The use of proITÚssory note was cIearer in the sense that the borrower was always
hable for the debt. Figure 3 illustrates the employrnent of promissory notes as
instruments of credit. For instance, an industrialist sold cotton yarn to a cotton-
weaving firmo This firm's fabrics were then sold to yet another firm which printed
15 L. Castañeda and X. Tafunell, 'Un nuevo indicador para la historia financiera española: la cotización
de las letras de cambio a corto plazo', Revista de Histaria Económica, 11 (1993); and 1. Castañeda,
'Crédito y mercado monetario no bancario en Barcelona a mediados del siglo XIX. Algunas
consideraciones sobre la pervivencia de instrumentos financieros tradicionales', V Congreso de la
Asociación de Historia Económica (San Sebastián, 1993).
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cial activities are given below when our database is described) and Antoni Galí i
Cia, one ofhis best customers. Both furnilies were in the wool trade and had known
each other for more than a half of a century. Antoni Gan had become one of the
most important Spanish woollens manufacturer and bought a great deal of the raw
wool from Pere Turull. Galí was given credit for more than one year for his
purchases of wool from Turull. He paid when it was convenient for him to do so,
and Turull accepted that almost all of these payments would take the form of the
transfer of bills of exchange issued by third paTries. These bills were obtained by
Galí in payment for his own commercial operations. Turull was aware that some of
these bilis would not be met but trusted CaJí to take charge of them. Thus the
reputation of the customer (who passed the bill to the firm) was far more important
that that of the final debtor (who was ultimately responsible for the debt). Turull
could do one ofthree different things with the bills he took from his customers. He
could pass them to another f1ITn to cancel sorne debt; or he could sell them to his
Barcelona banker; or, and exceptionally, he could try to receive payment directly
fmm the fmal debtor ofthe bill.
We argue that the main use of bills of exchange was as a medium of exchange.
This can be justified by looking at the accounts of the finm for the period of this
study. The vast majority ofbills, and other documents, accepted by these únm were
passed on to meet their own obligations, that is, they were used as a means of
payment. For instance, Miquel Puig's accounts show that, in T860, only two bilIs of
exchange were discounted at a bank while the other 147 were given to different
únm to pay commercial debts. The same practice can be found in the affairs ofPere
Turull, whose volume of trade undertaken via the circulation of bills of exchange
was much greater. Nearly aH the bilis that he took in payment for his sales were used
to discharge his debts since he only used other means of payment than credit
docuITlents in T7, out of696, payments for purchases.
Economic growth arising from industriansation caused an increase in the number
of both commercial transactions and agents in the markets. Consequently, the
amount ofbills in the market and their use grew at a rapid rateo For this reason, the
bili of exchange becaITle less secure as payment but, at the same time, more accept-
able because of its generalised circulation. Anyway, its non-payment and nego-
tiation were costly. This was due to the lengthy and expensive formal requirements
that had to be met when making a legal c1aim for the payment of a bill.
A typical bill of exchange was created when a commercial transaction gave rise
to a debt between two úrms. The selier drew the document against the buyer, but
incurred the ultimate legal responsibility for ít whenever the fmal debtor did not
accept the bill. Usualiy, the seller would pass the document to another firm to meet
a debt, while the receiving úrm normally had no connection with the original
transaction. This third úrm could also pass the bill to a fourth firm and, eventuaHy,
the bili would be paid by the final debtor against whom it was drawn. If the final
debtor did not accept the bill, each one of the agents who had accepted it could
ITlake a claim for the payment against the Eirm which had passed it to them.
Obviously, the fmal responsibility for the payment of the debt was with the Eirm
who initially drew the bill of exchange. Consequently, only reputation, conEidence
and continuity of exchanges made the use ofbills of exchange an efticient means of
payment.
To sum up. Whereas bilis' intrinsic qualitíes were unfavourable for their use as
efflCient media of exchange, nonetheless the existence of commercial informal
networks made this not only possible but also economicaliy advantageous. Bilis of
exchange were instruments of payment for agents inside these networks. Within
business circles, the only requirement for taking a bill of exchange as money was to
know and trust the agent who offered it. This was sufflCient to make the bill
acceptable as means of payment. Hence, it was unnecessary to know the person
who had to pay the bili in the last instance. By necessities ofbusiness, agents within
these networks were very interested in sustaining long-term commercial relation-
ships and, consequently, had to sustain their individual reputations by honouring
their obngations. Moreover, it was not easy to penetrate these networks. An
unknown entrepreneur would be asked for a good reference or even a guarantee
before being accepted as a regular customer.
IV
The objective of this section is to provide some empirical evidence concerned with
individual decision-making in the choice of media of exchange. Aggregate data do
not provide much information for such an analysis. However, the availability of
new micro-historical data allows its examination from an entirely new perspective.
Using material gathered from the accounts of several Catalan textile Eirms for the
period 1859-60, an econometric relationship is put forward, based on the theoreti-
cal intuitions described in the models that have been previously explained. In
particular, we present two different models in trying to identiry the most relevant
variables that explain the type of medium of exchange used in the different com-
mercial transactions of the úrms that have been analysed.
The entire database for the analysis was constructed by looking directly at the
accounts of three different firms. Each observation corresponds to a payment oper-
ation for a previous sale made by the Eirm. In other words, each data-point describes
several characteristics of these transactions and the media of exchange used to
complete them. Moreover, the speciúc characteristics of the customers involved in
each of the operations are considered.
The three finm were involved in the textile industry, the most important within
manufacturing in Catalonia during the mid-nineteenth century. Furthermore, the
three únm can be considered to be representatives of three different branches
within the Catalan textile industry: Pere Turull- raw materials; Miquel Puig i Cia
- intermediate products; and Societat Puig - final products.
Pere Turull, a specialist in the wool trade, was located in Sabadell, approximately
30 km. from Barcelona, which was the rnain Spanish centre of wool textile pro-
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currency which led to the use ofalternative means of exchange to make payments.
At the same time, there is a need to control for the intrinsic characteristics of the
transactions that may influence in the choice ofmeans ofpayment.
The dependent variable is dichotomic and takes the value zero when the debt
originated by the transaction was cancelled with legal currencies such as gold and
silver coins, notes issued by the Banc de Barcelona and bitllets de calderilla catalana.
Ir takes the value one when the debt was cancelled with sorne other documents:
bills of exchange, promissory notes, bonds and similar instruments.
The main hypothesis can be expressed by the following model:
Prob(DocuMENT = 1) = f(ct + {JBCN +yEsp +bCAT +eNuM + (PUR +}J.) (1)
This model means that the probability that payment was made without legal cur-
reneies is a non-linear function of the following variables:
BCN, a dichotomic variable that takes value I if the ftnn to which the payment
was made was located in Barcelona (Societat Puig) and value o otherwise;
Esp, also a dichotomic variable which takes value I when the flrm to which the
payrnent was made was located in Esparreguera (Miquel Puig i Cia) and o otherwise;
CAT, a dichotomic variable that takes value 1 when the customer who paid for a
transaction was located in Catalonia, and o otherwise;
NUM, a variable which measures the number of transactions that took place
during 1859-60 between the customer and the finn who were the subjects of each
transaction;
Table 2. Transactions in the sample classified by means oJpayrnent
1,106 92·32 1,803,178 73·79
92 7·68 640,393 26.21
1,198 100.00 2,443,57 J 100.00
193 16.II 866,173 35·45
1,005 83. 89 1,577,398 64·55
1,198 100.00 2,443,571 100.00
39.9 1
60.09
IOO.OO
% oftotal
value
PTA
value
1,622,852
2,443,571
4,066,423
41.73
58.2 7
roo.oo
% oftotal
number
Operations
Number
Source; see texto
Type
*(i) documents only, ofwhich:
bilis of exchange
others
Total
Currency
Documents*
Total
*(ii) documents only, ofwhich:
signed
unsigned
Total
-
duction. The firm was very important, controlling more than 40 per cent of the
wool trade in Sabadell, and most of its customers carne from the town or its
immediate area. The volume ofcommercial intercourse was affected by the amount
of legal currency available in Sabadell being very scarce in relationship to that
required by a growing economy. This was dUe to there being no local commercial
banking institutions and a lack ofdirect links with financial institutions in Barcelona.
As a result, for instance, employers in Sabadell paid workers with privately-issued
notes, which did not have any legal backing but were accepted by the town's
shopkeepers. Pere T urull sold wool by giving open credit to its customers that had
no supporting documentation. These debts were discharged by Pere Turull taking
as payment either legal currency or sorne other documents, such as bilis ofexchange
drawn by a third party. In these instances, the bilIs were neither credit nor transfer
instruments but a means ofpayment. 16
Miquel Puig i Cia was the sixth largest industrial finn in the Catalan cotton
industry, producing yam and coarse fabrics which were sold ro other Catalan
rnanufacturers. Although its factory was in Esparreguera on the banks of the river
Llobregat, all its business affairs were conducted at its main office in Barcelona. 1?
The third firm, Societat Puig, printed cotton in Sants, Barcelona and sold fmished
cloth. 18 The relationships that these two fmm had with their respective customers
were similar to those ofPere Turull.
Table 2 shows the means of payment received by three firms in order to meet
debts. It should be noticed that the use of documents as means of payment was
more important than legal currency. Moreover, bilis of exchange were the most
common documents while unsigned documents were used more regularly than
signed documents.
The methodology used in the analysis of the data is the logit analysis. This
procedure allows the estimation of the probability of an event occurring, given a
sample of different explanatory variables. Specifically, given that the dependent
variable is dichotomic (in the case of the first model, it indicates whether a trans-
action is completed with legal currency or sorne other document), the logit esti-
mates a non-linear equation that indicates the deterrninant factors of a dichotomic
event.19
In the fmt model, it is assumed that several factors determined the decision to
pay for transactions with either legal currency or sorne other documento There was
insufficient currency eirculating in the market to satisfY the needs of agents to
complete their transactions. This situation was especially important in the case of
ftnns that were not in Barcelona and so did not have immediate access to formal
banking institutions. As a result, they experienced greater difficulty acquiring legal
16 Arxiu Historic de Sahadell, Sahadell: Fons PeTe Turull, Account md letter hooks, 1859-60.
17 Arxiu Nacional de CataJunya, Barcelona [hereafteT ANC]: Fons Sedó - Empresa MiqueI Puig i
Cia, Account books, 1859-60.
18 ANC: Fons Sedó - Societat Puig, Account books, r859-60.
10 For the econometric issues, see W. Greene, Econometric Analysis (New York, 1993).
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and PUR, a variable which measures the total value of the purchases (in pesetas)
that took place during 1859-60 between the customer and the finn subject of each
transaction.
The expected outcome for our analysis was that the probability of payment taking
place without legal currency was a positive function of the variables NUM and PUR,
and a negative function of the variables BCN, Esp and CAT. lt was expected that
NUM would be positively related with the dependent variable because a sizeable
number of transactions between two agents indicates a closer, long-tenn commer-
cial relationship between them and, consequendy, a higher level of business confi-
dence. This reputation effect would explain why bilis of exchange (or other
documents) were easily accepted instead of universaliy acceptable legal currencies.
Likewise, PUR was also expected to be positively correlated with the dependent
variable. This is because a larger value of this variable can be considered to signal a
better 'quality' ofthe customer involved in the transaction. Obviously, good quality
customers could get documents, besides legal money, more easily accepted than
other customers. In a sense, there are two different variables which may be indica-
tive of a reputation effect. One is the number of transactions between finn and
customer, which shows the existence of an ongoing relationship with frequent
commercial agreements. The other is the total value of the transactions between
customers and fmns which indicates the relative importance of the customer and
may infiuence rus ability to pay with instruments other than legal money.
The estimates of the coefficients of the three dichotomic variables were expected
to be negative. Variables Esp and BCN were expected to be negatively correlated
with the dependent variable because the supply of legal money in Sabadeli was
comparatively smaller than in the other two markets and, consequentIy, transactions
involving a fmn located there imply a higher probability of payment with a docu-
ment other than fiat money. Likewise, variable CAT was expected to have a negative
estimated coefficienr. This is basicaliy because 6rms placed outside Catalonia had
greater difficulties finding legal currency with which to pay because elsewhere the
formal financial system was even less developed than in Catalonia. In addition, it
was easier during the rrúd-century to transfer bilis of exchange than coins. lt should
be remembered that bank notes only circulated in the area around their place of
issue while promissory notes could only be legally enforced in the town where they
had been signed. Such a context made it more likely for firms located outside
Catalonia to have documents accepted as payment for their debts.
The results ofthe estimation of the first model are summarised in Table 3. All the
estimated coefflcients of the variables have the expected signs and are significantIy
differenr from zero (as shown in column Signif.). Looking at the R column, it can
be seen that variables Esp and BCN make a similar partial explanatory contribution
to the model and are the most relevant variables. This is clearly indicative that
restrictions on the monetary market were relatively important in the choice of
media of exchange by firms. Notice that the other variables are significant but their
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partial contribution to the model is less relevant. Final1y, note that the different
meaSutes of the goodness of ftt of the whole model are satisfactory with the
hypothesis that this model úts we11 the available data.
All documents, which were used as substitutes for money, can be classified within
two different categories. First, there were documents which had to be paid sorne
days after their presentation to the person who initia11y issued them (unsigned
documents). Second, there are those which had to be paid at a particular date
(documents signed by the debtor). In general terms, the ftrst type were far easier to
transfer than the ~econd because they did not have a deadline beyond which the
legal enforcement of the payment was much more difficult. The second type of
documents had srronger legal protection before the deadline date because they were
signed by the debtor himself. Consequently, it could be said that, while the first
type of documents had a liquidity advantage (easy transfer), the second were safer
from the point ofview oflegal protection.
The second of out models analyses how the choice of media of exchange can be
related to these intrinsic characteristics of the documents used as money. A sub-
sample of Out database has been taken, consisting of a11 operations where agents
used documents other than currency to cancel debts (1,198 observations). The
dependent variable is a dichotomic variable indicating whether transactions were
undertaken with either unsigned documents or signed documents. The variable
takes the value one if the document was signed by the debtor and zero otherwise.
The model is as fo11ows:
Prob(SIGNED = 1) =f(Cl+ fiPTA +yDAY + ÓEsp+ jJ.)
According to this model, the probability that the cancellation of a debt was made
with a signed document, that is, a document which had to be paid before a
particular date specifted in it, is a function of the folIowing variables:
PTA, a variable that measures the value of the debt generated in each of the
operations;
DAY, a variable that measures the number of days that passed between the day
when the document was received by the ftrm and the fmt day when the firm
was paid;
and Esp, which has been previously described.
The expected outcome of the estimation of the model was that the probability that
payment took place with a signed document would be a positive function of the
variables PTA, DAY and Esp. lt was expected that PTA would be positively related
with the dependent variable because as the amount of the debt involved rose, it
became more important to obtain a safe payrnent rather than an easily transferable
asset. Likewise, DAY was also expected to be positively correlated with the depen-
dent variable because úrms would have only been willing to accept signed docu-
ments in cases when the date ofpayment (after which the document lost part of its
legal enforceability) was late enough. In fact, it could be said that signed documents
are mostly instrnments ofcredit rather than strict means ofpayment. The coefficient
of the variable Esp was also expected to be positive. However, this is due to the
particular firm studied, which was located in Esparreguera, having contracts with
sorne of its customers of which signed documents were a parto Apart fram this
aspect of this particular firm's business, we had no other reason for expecting
differences among the different firms in our sample.
The results of the estimation of this second model are contained in Table 4. AH
the estimated coefficients of the variables have the expected signs and are signift-
cantly different from zera (as shown in column Signif.). When the R column is
inspected, it wili be seen that the variable DAY has the most important partial
explanatory contribution to the model. Notice that the other variables are signifi-
cant but their partial contribution to the model is less relevant. Fina11y, it should be
noted that the different measures of the goodness of ftt of the whole model are
satisfactory with the hypothesis that the model fits the available data we11.
v
This paper has analysed the main determinants of the use ofdifferent assets as media
of exchange in Catalonia fram 1844 to 1874. The main hypothesis has been that,
during this period, the Catalan economy grew rapidly in the absence of sufl1cient
legal currency. In this context, media of exchange, other than coins and legal notes,
were employed by economic agents to carry out their cornmercial exchanges. Thus
bilis of exchange and other privately-issued documents were used extensively as
means of payment. Although bilis of exchange lacked many of the qualities that
would make them the most 'natural' universal1y accepted medium of exchange, the
uncoordinated behaviour of agents in their cornmercial relationships resulted in the
extensive circulation of these documents. They were widely accepted by many
firms as means ofsettling debts.
The empirical analysis has shown that the main determinants for the acceptance
of documents, other than legal currency, were, in the first place, the relative scarcity
of universa11y acceptable legal currencies and, in the second place, the particular
characteristics of the cornmercial counterpart who passed the bill as payment for his
debt. Thus acceptability ofmedia ofexchange, other than legal money, was strongly
related to variables which are indicative of long-term commercial relationships and,
consequently, higher levels of confidence and good reputation between trade part-
ners. lt has also been possible to show which variables affected the type ofdocument
that was accepted as medium of exchange. Signed documents were preferred in
transactions involving sizeable amounts and also when the date of payment was late
enough with respect to the date of receipt.
The number of suggestions for further research that arises in these topics is very
large. First, and from a theoretical viewpoint, it would be very interesting to
introduce ideas of personal reputation in long-lasting cornmercial reIationships
within the context of the search-theoretical models of money. This seerns to us the
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appropriate context in which episodes, such as that considered here or free-banking
regimes that were commonplace in many countries during the nineteenth century,
can be understood from an analytical perspective. Second, it is worth investigating
whether the Catalan experience, or that of Lancashire previously investigated by
Ashton,20 are representative of the situation of the monetary market in other
countries during industrialisation. The availability of more, and better, data from
individual firrm is necessary to test whether bilis of exchange (and similar docu-
ments) played a role as media of exchange. Related to this last point, it would be
very interesting to study time series of currency supply in order to link them with
the circulation ofbilis of exchange as money. This would allow an understanding of
whether bilis ofexchange were more easily acceptable when currency was relatively
more scarce. One could test in this fashion whether there is a mechanism built into
the economy that allows it to create its own supply of media of exchange, partly
independent of the creation of currency. It appears appropriate to refonnulate the
concept of monetary supply and its part in the analysis of industrialisation and
economic growth. We believe that we have given sorne evidence indicating that
traditional measures of monetary supply may be too narrow. Furthennore, the role
ofmonetary restrictions in economic growth should be revised because our analysis
seems to suggest that agents may be able to overcome this type of constraint. We do
not know whether this system of exchange, partly based on the circulation of
privately-issued documents, such as bilis of exchange, was very efficient compared
with an alternative system, based on fuliy available universal media of exchange.
These and related questions can only be answered by considering a theoretical
model ofmonetary exchange which examines the possible welfare gains of loosen-
ing monetary constraints. Third, we think that explanations of mid-nineteenth-
century Spanish price stability, based on arguments such as bimetallism, need careful
re-examination in the light of sorne of our arguments. All these considerations are
left to further research.
20 Ashton, 'Bilis ofexchange in Lancasrure' .
